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Several recent education reform measures, including the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),
couple school choice with accountability measures to allow parents of children in under-performing
schools the opportunity to choose higher-performing schools. We use the introduction of NCLB in
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District to determine if the choice component had an impact on
the schools parents chose and if those changed choices led to academic gains. We find that 16% of
parents responded to NCLB notification by choosing schools that had on average 1 standard deviation
higher average test scores than their current NCLB school. We then use the lottery assignment of students
to chosen schools to test if changed choices led to improved academic outcomes. On average, lottery
winners experience a significant decline in suspension rates relative to lottery losers. We also find
that students winning lotteries to attend substantially better (above-median) schools experience significant
gains in test scores. Because proximity to high-scoring schools drives both the probability of choosing
an alternative school and the average test score at the school chosen, our results suggest that the availability
of proximate and high-scoring schools is an important factor in determining the degree to which school
choice and accountability programs can succeed at increasing choice and immediate academic outcomes
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
The federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 set out to reform public education by 
introducing accountability measures coupled with a public school choice requirement for all 
schools receiving federal Title I funds (Title I schools).
1 The public school choice component 
requires that districts allow parents of children at persistently under-performing schools the 
choice to send their child to a higher-performing school.
2  Public school choice provisions are 
included in several state-level accountability systems on which NCLB was in part based.
3  Such 
school choice and accountability programs are intended to provide all students the opportunity to 
obtain a high-quality education, as stated in the Department of Education’s NCLB Public School 
Choice Guide: “When all students … are provided high-quality educational options, and when 
parents receive enough information to make intelligent choices among those options, public 
school choice can increase both equity and quality in education.”
4  Thus the purpose of public 
school choice within an accountability program is two-fold. First, the choice provision offers 
parents the immediate option to send their child to a higher-performing school. Second, the threat 
of expanded parental choice may give schools a greater incentive to avoid regulation by 
improving student learning to reach stipulated academic achievement goals. 
 
This paper empirically examines how effective school choice and accountability systems might 
be at accomplishing the first goal. We do so by estimating the impact of the NCLB school choice 
provision in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District (CMS) on parents’ choices and 
subsequent student outcomes. The primary purpose of the choice provision is to give students at 
NCLB schools the opportunity to choose to attend schools with higher academic achievement 
                                                 
1 Title I schools receive federal funds provided to school districts for assistance in improving the academic 
performance of students from low-income families. We will outline how Title 1 status is determined in the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District in detail in Section 3. 
2 Title I Improving schools are Title I schools that have failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for two 
consecutive years. We will outline how AYP is determined in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District in detail in 
Section 3. Under NCLB, parents cannot choose another Title 1 Improving school for their child. The extent of 
school choices can vary by district, as NCLB set out broad provisions but allowed states and local districts flexibility 
in exactly how those mandates would be implemented.  
3 See Figlio and Rouse (2006), West and Peterson (2006), and Hanushek and Raymond (2004, 2005) among others 
for analyses of state-based accountability systems.  
4 U.S. Department of Education. (2004). Public school choice. 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/schoolchoiceguid.pdf. (Page 9). 
   4
and to provide parents with clear information on academics to make an informed decision. The 
intent is that expanded choice and simplified information on academic performance (rating 
system) will allow these students to benefit from a higher-quality education. We find evidence 
that the NCLB choice provision in CMS accomplished this goal for a significant fraction of 
students. These families responded by choosing significantly better schools, and their children 
experienced academic gains as a result of being admitted to those schools. However, we show 
that that the proximity of schools with high test scores is an important factor determining the 
probability of choosing an alternative school in response to NCLB notification, the average test 
score at the alternative school chosen, and the subsequent impact of attending that school on 
academic outcomes. Thus it is not clear how successful the school choice provision would be in 
school districts with wide geographic densities of under-performing schools.  
 
Because information on parental choice is often limited, and because NCLB just recently came 
into effect, most researchers have focused on estimating the incentives for marginal schools to 
improve to avoid regulation in states with accountability systems similar to those introduced 
under NCLB (Figlio and Rouse (2006), West and Peterson (2006), Hanushek and Raymond 
(2004, 2005)). There is some evidence that such accountability programs increase academic 
achievement at marginal schools; however, there is question as to whether the findings are 
generated by true gains in academic achievement or simply by gains in test score performance 
(Figlio and Getzler (2002), Jacob (2005), Chakrabarti (2005), Cullen and Reback (2006)). 
However, understanding parental choice response to regulation is a critical component in 
understanding the effect of school choice and accountability measures on school incentives and 
equilibrium outcomes. If regulation changes the population of families who choose to attend a 
school, schools may face weaker or stronger incentives to avoid regulation and may take 
different strategies to improve.   
 
We use a unique policy experiment, the integration of NCLB into the newly-created school 
choice plan in CMS, in order to understand how NCLB notification affected parental choice. 
Starting in the 2002-2003 school year, CMS moved from a system of school assignment for 
racial integration to a district-wide public school choice plan. Each subsequent spring the school 
district elicited from parents the top three choices of where they wanted their child to go to   5
school and allocated slots at over-demanded schools by lottery. At the end of the 2003-2004 
school year, CMS determined which schools failed to meet NCLB performance criteria. Students 
slated to attend these schools in the fall were re-issued choice forms that summer, along with 
notification that their school had failed to make AYP for two years in a row. They also received 
the NCLB-required simplified information on academic performance at their school and at all 
other schools in the district. This was a basic printout that listed every school in the district 
(regardless of grade level and program) along with its proficiency score (the percent of students 
who tested at or above grade level in reading and in math on the prior year’s standardized tests).  
 
We are able to compare the choices parents made in the spring (prior to notification) with the 
choices they made in that summer after receiving the NCLB notification letter. Because the two 
rounds of choice fall so closely together, we can compare choices within student, before and 
after the notification, thereby credibly holding all else equal (including grade level). In addition, 
after receiving the summer NCLB choice forms, the district assigned students to schools based 
on a lottery system. We can use these assignments to identify the effect of attending a chosen 
school on academic outcomes. We find that NCLB notification led to a significant change in the 
choice behavior of parents. Approximately 16% of parents who received notification responded 
by choosing a school different from their NCLB school. These parents chose schools with 
average test scores approximately 1 standard deviation higher than the schools they chose to 
attend just a few months earlier.
5 Thus, the NCLB notification with the information on academic 
performance facilitated the choice of a higher-performing alternative school for a significant 
fraction of parents.  
 
We then use the lottery assignment of students to oversubscribed schools to determine if the 
choices caused by NCLB notification resulted in higher academic achievement. We measure 
academic achievement using observable student-level statistics such as absences, suspension 
rates, and standardized test scores. We find that students who were randomly admitted to the 
chosen school experienced a 9.9 percentage point decline in the probability of having a week or 
                                                 
5 This is 1 standard deviation in the distribution of scores across schools in the district, which translates into about 
0.5 student-level standard deviations. We will show that this change in choice behavior is not generated by the 
restriction that students exercising choice under NCLB cannot choose to attend other Title I Improving schools. 
Rather, parents who responded to the NCLB notification picked higher-scoring schools controlling for this choice 
set restriction.   6
more suspensions off of a mean of 25.8 percent. On average, students experience a positive but 
statistically insignificant increase in standardized test scores. We do find evidence that students 
who apply to schools that are substantially higher-scoring than their current school experience 
significant improvements in test scores. Among students with above-median differences between 
the chosen school’s average test score and the score at their current NCLB school, admission to 
the chosen school increased test scores by 0.17-0.19 student-level standard deviations.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant NCLB 
literature. Section 3 describes the school choice plan and implementation of NCLB in CMS. 
Section 4 discusses the data and empirical results for the effect of NCLB notification on choices. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results for the effect of NCLB notification on student 
outcomes. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
 
There is little empirical evidence to date on the impact of NCLB on parental school choices and 
subsequent student outcomes. Because the regulation is so recent and information on student 
choices is often not available, researchers have focused on the impacts of state accountability 
systems on academic achievement. Greene (2001), Figlio and Rouse (2006), and West and 
Peterson (2006) examine the effect of the Florida A+ Plan on school average test scores. They all 
find a relative improvement in test scores at low-performing schools that are faced with the 
threat of offering school vouchers (close to regulation, but not actually regulated). Figlio and 
Rouse (2006), however, provide evidence that these gains are mainly due to the stigma of being 
labeled a low-achieving school instead of voucher threats. Clark (2003) examines the 1990 
Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) which consists of funding, academic, and 
accountability reforms. She does not find an impact on academic performance measures for 
white students but does find some evidence that KERA increased the performance of black 
students. Hanushek and Raymond (2004, 2005) and Carnoy and Loeb (2002) construct state-
level panel data on accountability systems and find a positive relationship between average test 
scores and accountability measures. However, Figlio and Getzler (2002), Jacob (2005), 
Chakrabarti (2005), and Cullen and Reback (2006) all provide evidence that changes in school-  7
level average accountability measures may result from policy-induced behavior aimed at 
maximizing test scores that count in regulation rather than improving academic achievement in 
and of itself. 
 
However, most of these studies do not examine how the choice component of accountability 
systems such as NCLB affects parents’ choices and subsequent student achievement (West and 
Peterson (2006)). Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006a) examine parental choices and preferences 
using the introductory year of school choice in CMS. They find that low-income parents of 
students with low academic performance tend to place a low weight on academics when 
choosing schools. Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) randomize simplified 
information on academic quality of schools across non-NCLB schools serving middle- to low-
income students. They show that receiving simplified information with the school choice form 
causes an increase in active choice participation, an increase in the average test score of the 
chosen schools, and a doubling in the estimated preference for academic performance. They 
conclude that a lower preference for academics for low-income students is consistent with higher 
information and decision making costs. In a similar manner, NCLB requires that families be 
provided with simplified information on the academic quality of their own school as well as on 
other schools in the district. We find in CMS that a fraction of students respond by choosing 
much higher academically-performing schools. 
 
Another line of research estimates the academic gains for students who exercise choice. These 
papers exploit random assignment of students to over-demanded schools in school choice or 
voucher programs to estimate the average treatment effect of attending a first-choice school, 
conditional on the school chosen (Witte, Sterr, and Thorn (1995); Greene, Peterson, and Du 
(1997), Witte (1997), Rouse (1998), Peterson, Myers, and Howell (1998), Mayer et al. (2002), 
Krueger and Zhu (2004), and Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006)). These papers have been unable 
to find robust or significant academic gains from attending a first-choice school; however, 
Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006b) combine detailed information on student choices with 
lottery randomization into first-choice schools and show that students placing a high weight on 
academics when choosing schools experience significant academic gains when randomized into 
their first-choice schools. We will show that NCLB led some parents to choose schools with   8
substantially higher scores and that their children experienced some gains in traditional measures 
of academic outcomes as a result of gaining admission to those schools.  
 
 
3.  CMS School Choice Plan and No Child Left Behind 
 
3.1.  Overview of the CMS School Choice Plan 
 
CMS introduced district-wide school choice in the fall of 2002. Prior to that, CMS operated 
under a racial desegregation order for three decades, busing students from discontinuous 
neighborhoods to achieve racial balance at schools across the district. In September 2001, the 
U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the district to dismantle the race-based student 
assignment plan by the beginning of the next school year. In December 2001, the school board 
voted to approve a new district-wide public school choice plan. 
  
In the spring of 2002, parents were asked to submit their top three choices of school programs for 
each child. Each student was assigned a “home school” in her neighborhood, often the closest 
school to her, and was guaranteed a seat at this school. Magnet students were similarly 
guaranteed admission to continue in their current magnet programs. Admission for all other 
students was limited by grade-specific capacity limits set by the district. Students could choose 
any school in the district; however, busing transportation was only guaranteed to schools in a 
student’s quadrant of the district (the district was split into 4 quadrants called “choice zones”). 
The district allowed significant increases in school enrollment size in the first year of the school 
choice program in an expressed effort to give each child one of her top three choices. In the 
spring of 2002, the district received choice applications for approximately 105,000 of 110,000 
students. Admission to over-subscribed schools was determined by a lottery system as described 
in Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006b). 
 
Once the first year of school choice was completed, students were required to submit choice 
forms in subsequent years only if they were new to the district, rising graders (Kindergarten, 6
th, 
or 9
th grade), affected by changes in home school boundaries due to new school openings, or   9
wanted to change schools from their current school assignment. In other words, once the first 
year of school choice was completed, and students were for the most part attending chosen 
schools, students had the guaranteed right to remain in that school until the terminal grade and 
did not need to submit a choice form unless they wanted to change schools again. In the 
following two years, CMS continued to experience near complete participation in the school 
choice plan. In each year, admission to over-subscribed schools was determined by a lottery 
system. However, after the first year of choice, CMS did not expand capacities at schools in an 
attempt to accommodate demand, and hence, the number of oversubscribed schools increased 
substantially. 
 
3.2. Information on Schools 
 
In order for parents to determine which schools to choose, CMS provided several resources. 
First, each family received a choice book. The choice book was approximately 100 pages long. It 
contained detailed instructions on how to complete the school choice form and how to submit it 
along with a brief description of the lottery process.
6 The bulk of the choice book was devoted to 
written descriptions of each school and program, from preschool through high school. There are 
approximately 120 elementary, 40 middle, and 30 high school choice options in the district. The 
descriptions were written by the schools, describing the positive features each school offered to 
students. Objective measures of school characteristics such as average test score performance, 
suspension rates, or racial compositions were not provided. 
 
In addition, CMS provided a family application center that parents could phone or visit in order 
to ask questions about the school choice process. The staff members at the family planning 
center were instructed to emphasize the positive aspects of each school during their discussions 
with parents. In particular, staff members were supposed to respond to questions like “Which 
school is the best school?” by advising parents to discuss with their children what their needs 
were and then to visit the different school options in order to determine which school was the 
best for their children, since what a “good” school is depends on each individual child.  
                                                 
6 Parents were not told how the lottery was run (e.g. first-choice maximizer) or how ‘priority boosts’ were 
implemented.   10
 
CMS also offers an extensive website. On this website, parents can review statistics for each 
school one-by-one. The school profiles provide statistics such as physical locations, standardized 
test score performances, suspension rates, racial compositions, and attendance rates. However, 
statistics for schools were reported as averages for the entire school even if different school 
programs were housed on the same campus (e.g. magnet program and non-magnet program). 
This aggregation may mask the true achievement rates of the separate school choice options on 
each campus. In addition, parents would have to view all statistics for each school separately, 
instead of viewing a statistic for all of their choice options on one simplified page. Hence, 
obtaining objective information on schools would involve a significant web search and 
comparison.  
 
3.3. The Implementation of NCLB in CMS 
 
NCLB legislation was introduced in January 2002. Beginning in the summer of 2003, CMS 
implemented NCLB in accordance with North Carolina state regulation that in turn was based on 
federal requirements. Each year, all schools are required to make Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP). However, only Title I schools face sanctions under NCLB if they fail to do so. As 
defined by CMS, a school is a Title I school (receives federal Title I funds) if 75% or more of its 
students qualify for federal lunch subsidies. As defined by North Carolina under NCLB 
compliance, a school needs to satisfy certain academic targets for 10 subgroups of students in 
order to make AYP.
7 Each subgroup needed to have forty or more students for it to be included 
in the determination of school AYP. If just one target was missed for one subgroup, then the 
school failed to make AYP. Targets include the percentage of students scoring proficient on 
North Carolina standardized tests for math and reading for each subgroup (with the percentage 
needed to make AYP gradually increasing over time in order to meet the federal requirement of 
100% proficiency by the end of the 2013-14 school year)
8, a minimum participation rate in each 
of the exams for each subgroup (95% in each year or averaged over the prior two or three years), 
                                                 
7 For North Carolina, the subgroups are the entire school, Asian, American Indian, Black, Hispanic, Multi-racial, 
White, economically disadvantaged, limited English proficiency, and students with disabilities. 
8 This requirement can also be satisfied for a subgroup if its percent proficient falls within a 95% confidence interval 
for the target percent proficient.   11
attendance rates for elementary and middle school students (an increase in 0.1% from the 
previous year or anything over 90%), and graduation rates for high school students (an increase 
in 0.1% from the previous year or anything over 90%).
9 
 
At the end of the 2003-2004 school year, CMS compiled the test score outcomes for schools in 
the district and determined that sixteen schools, ten elementary and six middle schools, were 
both Title I schools and had failed to make AYP for the past two years. These schools were 
categorized as Title I Improving and entered regulation under NCLB. The regulation implied that 
parents needed to be notified of the NCLB status of their school and offered the choice to attend 
an alternative school. In addition, the district (as part of a federal requirement) was required to 
supply with this notification information on the academic achievement of the schools that parents 
could select.
10 CMS provided information on the percent of students in the NCLB school who 
made grade level in reading or math (percent proficient) for every school in the district (a three 
page spread-sheet print-out), as well as list of Title I Improving schools since students exercising 
choice under NCLB were not allowed to choose to attend another Title I Improving school. Thus 
the NCLB legislation provided simplified information to parents on the academic achievement at 
their school and at every other school in the district along with notification that their school had 
failed to make AYP and that they therefore had a right to choose to send their child to another 
non-NCLB school. 
 
Parents who received the NCLB notification had submitted (along with all other parents) choice 
forms in the spring of 2004 for the 2004-2005 school year. Because NCLB schools were 
identified in June 2004, at the end of the school year, CMS re-sent choice forms in July along 
with the NCLB notification to parents of students slated to attend NCLB schools in the fall. 
These forms had a similar format to the typical CMS choice form and allowed parents to submit 
three choices for what school they would like their child to attend in the 2004-2005 school year. 
Because of the timing of the choice plan and determination of NCLB schools, we are able to 
observe how choices change for parents receiving NCLB forms. We observe their choices 
                                                 
9 For information on other means by which subgroups can make AYP, please see the Consolidated State Application 
for North Carolina (2005) which provides federal NCLB guidelines along with North Carolina’s implementation of 
these guidelines. 
10 U.S. Department of Education. (2004). Public school choice. 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/schoolchoiceguid.pdf. (Page 18).   12
submitted in the spring of 2004 for which school they would like their child to attend in the fall. 
After parents received the NCLB notification letter, we observe their choices submitted in July 
2004 for which school they would like their child to attend in the fall given this new information 
on their school’s relative academic performance. 
 
Once the NCLB choice forms were received, parents had approximately one month to submit 
them. Students were then entered into a choice lottery. CMS made spaces available at previously 
full schools (partly through normal summer attrition of current students) in order to 
accommodate NCLB students. Students were sorted by priority group and a randomly assigned 
lottery number.
11 Admission to schools was thus determined first by priority group and then by 
lottery number. Priority groups were based on academic achievement (above- or below-grade 
level) and lunch-recipient status. This was done to satisfy the federal requirement that the poorest 
and lowest-achieving students be allowed the first opportunity to attend an alternative school.  
 
The lottery was not run as a first-choice maximizer as was typically done in the spring lotteries 
for the district as a whole. Instead, all of a student’s choices were evaluated at once when her 
lottery number came up. Parents, as usual, did not know the lottery process, and in this case they 
were not informed of the NCLB-specific priority groupings either. If a student did not gain 
admission to any of her choices, her parents were allowed to check a box that stated that they 
would like the district to attempt to place their child administratively in a non-NCLB school with 
an open slot instead of returning her to her NCLB school. The district would then supply an 
assigned school in August, and parents could accept or reject that school over their current 
NCLB school at that point. Of the students used in our analysis, 1,092 out of 6,695 submitted a 
choice form in July and chose a school other than their current NCLB school. Of these, 615 
checked the box saying that they did not wish to return to their NCLB school if they did not get 
any of their choices. Of these, 208 did not receive one of their choices and were offered 




                                                 
11 The random number was assigned by a computer using an algorithm that we verified with CMS computer 
programmers.   13
4.  Data and Regression Analysis 
 
4.1.  Data Description 
 
We have secure access to administrative data from CMS including choice form information for 
every student who submitted a form in the Spring 2004 school choice round and the July 2004 
NCLB choice round, student-level lottery numbers for each choice round, school assignments, 
attendance records, test score outcomes, and student demographics. We also have information on 
student and school locations. We use the student-level data to construct school characteristics. 
These characteristics include percent black, percent of students receiving lunch subsidies, and 
average standardized test scores - each student’s test score is standardized by grade level, and the 
average of these standardized scores over the students at a school choice is the school choice’s 
test score measure. We focus on elementary and middle schools (students in K-8
th grades), since 
there were no Title 1 Improving high schools in CMS. 
 
Table I describes the schools that were designated Title I Improving at the end of the 2003-2004 
school year. The 16 Title I Improving schools had on average significantly lower test scores than 
the district average. However, there were elementary and middle schools with average test scores 
in this range that were not Title I Improving because they either failed to make AYP both years 
but did not make Title I classification for at least one year (21 schools fall into this category) or 
because they were Title I both years but made AYP in at least one of the two years (13 schools 
fall into this category). Because Title I status in CMS is defined as 75% or above free- or 
reduced-lunch concentration, Title I Improving schools have a substantially higher-than-average 
lunch-recipient rate. In addition, they have a higher proportion of black students, a lower average 
neighborhood income level, and higher-than-average suspension rates. In addition, according to 
school-level capacity data from CMS, these schools are on-average under-demanded (below 
capacity) and have a smaller student body population.  
 
 
4.2.  The Effect of NCLB on Student Choices 
 
We began with the 8,284 students who received NCLB notification, of which 1,363 responded 
by filling out a form in July. Parents were told, just like in the regular spring lottery, that if they   14
wanted to remain at their current school, they did not have to fill out a form. We exclude from 
the analysis students who were not active in CMS at the time of the spring lottery (221 students), 
students with special needs or those being retained (1,245 additional students), and students who 
had missing demographic information (123 additional students). This left us with a sample of 
6,695 students who received NCLB notification, of which 1,149 responded by submitting a form 
in July. Of the parents who did fill out a form in July, 57 of them listed their current NCLB 
school as their first choice which they did not need to do in order to remain at their NCLB 
school. Thus, 1,092 students filled out a form in July and chose a school different than their 
current NCLB school first, and 5,603 students either did not respond to NCLB notification or 
chose their NCLB first in the July lottery. 
 
Student were slated to attend a NCLB school in the fall of 2004 for one of two reasons: their 
parents chose that school in the spring (either actively or through default), or their parents chose 
a different school, did not win admission, and the student was assigned to the NCLB school. 
Table II shows the cross tabulation of two indicators: if the parent chose the NCLB school in the 
spring, and if they chose a school other than their NCLB school in July. Parents who did not 
choose their NCLB school first in the spring but still got placed in the NCLB school were twice 
as likely to respond by choosing a school different than their NCLB school first in July (30.31% 
versus 14.55%). Approximately two thirds of parents who did not choose their NCLB school 
first in the spring did not decide to select another school in July. This may be because parents 
find it more difficult to change schools in the middle of the summer, not long before the new 
school year. Therefore, while NCLB notification doubled the fraction of students choosing to 
leave their NCLB school (865 versus 749), we may in fact be underestimating the effect given 
the timing of the notification. 
 
If we assume that parents who did not fill out a form in July wanted their child to attend the 
NCLB school, then we can estimate the average impact that NCLB had on parents’ choices. 
Table III presents a reduced-form regression of the effect that receiving a NCLB form had on the 
characteristics of students’ first-choice schools. The data include each student’s first-choice 
school in the spring and in July, where we assume that a student chose her current NCLB school 
first in July if she did not fill out a form. The average effect is the average within-student change   15
in the characteristics of the first-choice school before (Spring) and after (July) receiving the 
NCLB notification. Table III shows that receiving the NCLB form made parents less likely to 
choose their NCLB school first, and their first-choice schools had higher average test scores, 
lower percent black, and lower lunch subsidy rates. Although the coefficients are statistically 
significant, they are small in magnitude. For example, NCLB form receipt caused an average 
increase in the scores of schools chosen first of only 0.047 standard deviations – approximately 
one to two percentile point ranks. However, 84% of parents in our sample did not return the form 
or returned the form but chose their NCLB school first, therefore choosing a school with no 
change in average test scores.
12 The significant but small in absolute value increase suggests that 
NCLB had a very large impact on the characteristics of the first-choice school for the 16% who 
submitted forms and chose a school other than their NCLB school first in July.  
 
Table IV shows the differences in the characteristics of first-choice schools between spring and 
July choice rounds for students who responded in July by choosing a school other than their 
NCLB school first. The first two rows show that students chose schools first that were on 
average .5 student-level standard deviations higher in average test scores in July versus the 
spring. This is more than a 15 percentile point rank increase in scores and is 1 standard deviation 
higher based on the distribution of school average test scores. We break down these numbers by 
race; however, there is not a substantial difference by race. In addition, the schools chosen first 
in July had a substantially lower percent black and a substantially lower free- and reduced-lunch 
concentration. In the spring, the students’ first-choice schools were in the 78
th percentile of the 
distribution of school percent black and the 82
nd percentile of the distribution of school percent 
free and reduced lunch of the schools they could choose. In July, the students’ first-choice 
schools were in the 53
rd percentile of the distribution of school percent black and the 47
th 
percentile of the distribution of school percent free and reduced lunch of the schools they could 
choose. Because students were not allowed to choose other NCLB schools in the July lottery, we 
may be concerned that the increase in the score of the first-choice school is partly generated by 
the fact that students were prohibited from choosing some of the schools with low performance. 
Rows 3 and 4 show the average test score of schools within five miles of the student (an 
                                                 
12 As shown in Table II, about 9% of the students who chose their NCLB school first in July (by virtue of not 
submitting a form or by submitting a form and putting down their NCLB school first) chose a different school first 
in the spring and did not get in. For these students, the difference in test scores would not be zero.   16
approximation for relevant schools in the choice set). The average score of available schools 
increases from Row 3 to Row 4 due to the restriction that students could not select another 
NCLB school. If we compare Rows 1 and 2 to Rows 3 and 4, we see that students’ first-choice 
schools had lower-than-average test scores given their choice set in the spring and had higher-
than-average test scores given their choice set in July. Hence, the increase in the scores at the 
first-choice school was not mechanically generated by the choice set restriction placed by NCLB. 
 
The statistics presented in Table IV showed that a fraction of families who received NCLB 
notification responded by choosing substantially better schools. However, most families did not 
respond. We can empirically examine what types of families were more likely to respond by 
choosing a school other than their NCLB first in the July lottery; for example, did NCLB 
notification affect the choices of higher-achieving students more than it did for lower-scoring 
students? Tables V and VI both examine the decision to respond to the NCLB notification as a 
function of student and school characteristics. Table V presents simple differences in mean 
student attributes across these students who responded by choosing a school other than their 
NCLB school first in July versus students who chose their NCLB school first in July (the latter 
group includes students who did not fill out a form), controlling only for NCLB school fixed 
effects. The first two columns of statistics in Table V give the straight means for the two groups 
of students for each variable of interest. The final column reports the difference in means 
between the students who responded by choosing a school different from their NCLB school first 
in July versus students who chose their NCLB school first in July, adjusting for NCLB school 
fixed effects. 
 
The coefficients show that students who chose a school other than their NCLB school first in the 
spring, but did not gain admission to that school, were more likely to choose a school different 
from their NCLB school first again in July. This reflects the cross tabulations seen in Table II. In 
addition, students in rising grades were more likely to choose to attend a different school in July. 
This makes sense since many parents may find it easier to switch their child’s school at this time. 
We also find that black students and students who are in magnet programs in their NCLB schools 
are marginally statistically significantly more likely to choose a school other than their NCLB 
school first in July. There are no significant differences for most of the other student-level   17
demographics such as gender, lunch-recipient status, baseline test score, and income. However, 
parents of students who had more suspensions and who had fewer unexcused absences in the 
baseline year were more likely to respond to the NCLB notification by choosing a different 
school first in July. 
 
There are two other characteristics that are on average significantly different across the two 
groups of students. The distance from the family to the NCLB school and the average test score 
of local schools all significantly differ across students who responded by choosing a school other 
than their NCLB school first in July versus students who chose their NCLB school first in July. 
These variables would increase or decrease the attractiveness of the NCLB school relative to 
other potential schooling options. Students who responded by choosing a school other than their 
NCLB school first in July lived on average further from their NCLB school and also had higher 
average scoring schools to choose from within a five-mile driving distance. Hence alternatives to 
the NCLB school may have been slightly more attractive for these students, increasing the 
probability that they would respond to the NCLB notification by choosing a different school 
first. 
 
Table VI presents a conditional (fixed-effects) logit of the probability of responding to the NCLB 
notification by choosing a school other than the NCLB school first as a function of the baseline 
characteristics presented in Table V. Again, the fixed effects are at the NCLB school level. The 
logit results are for the most part consistent with the mean differences in Table V. Students who 
chose to attend a school other than their NCLB school in the spring, but were assigned back to 
their NCLB school, were significantly more likely to respond to the NCLB notification. The 
coefficient implies a 114% increase in the odds of responding (exp(.759) – 1), which translates 
into an 11.0 percentage point increase in the probability of responding to the NCLB notification 
by choosing a school other than the NCLB school first in July. In addition, an increase in 
baseline test score significantly increases the odds of choosing a school different from the NCLB 
school first in July. A one standard deviation increase in baseline test scores increases the odds 
of choosing out of the NCLB school by 11%, which translates into a 1.5 percentage point 
increase in the probability of responding by choosing out. Again we find that an increase in 
baseline number of unexcused absences significantly decreases the probability of responding,   18
while an increase in suspensions significantly increases the probability of responding. For this 
sample of students, the raw correlations between test scores, unexcused absences and 
suspensions are small (between 0.18 and 0.22 in absolute value), implying that the effects do not 
end up canceling each other out for a typical student. Taken together, there seem to be two types 
of students who responded to NCLB notification by choosing a school other than their NCLB 
school first in July: those who were doing on average better in school (higher test scores and 
fewer unexcused absences) and those who were having problems (more suspensions).  
 
The final significant determinant of responding to the NCLB notification is the average test score 
of nearby schools. If the average test score at nearby schools increases by one student-level 
standard deviation, there is an 84% increase in the odds of responding by choosing a school other 
than the NCLB school first. This translates into an 8.8 percentage point increase in the 
probability of responding. Thus, a key determinant of response is the availability of high-
achieving alternatives in the surrounding area. If there are not better alternatives available within 
a reasonable distance, parents may not choose out of failing schools simply because there are no 
better alternatives to choose from. 
 
Table IV showed that students who responded to the NCLB notification chose on average 
substantially better schools. There is, however, a large variation across responders in the average 
test scores of their chosen schools. Figure 1 shows a kernel density estimate of the difference in 
the test score of the first-choice school listed on the July choice form and the NCLB school for 
students who chose a school other than their NCLB school first in July. On average, responders 
selected first-choice schools with 0.62 student-level standard deviation higher test scores than 
their NCLB school. However, a small fraction of students chose schools that were close to or 
slightly worse performing than their NCLB school, while another minority of students chose 
some of the highest-performing schools in the district; schools that outperformed their NCLB 
school by over one student-level standard deviation in test scores. 
 
Of students who chose a school other than their NCLB school first in July, what types of students 
chose substantially better schools? Table VII presents regression results of the test score at the 
July first-choice school on baseline student characteristics for those who chose a school different   19
from their NCLB school first in July, controlling for NCLB school fixed effects. Students who 
did not choose their NCLB school first in the spring chose on average higher-scoring schools in 
July.  Black students chose schools with slightly lower test scores, as did students who were 
entitled to receive federal lunch subsidies and students with unexcused absences. Students 
enrolled in magnet programs at NCLB schools chose higher-scoring schools.   
 
The biggest observable determinant of the average score of the first-choice school in July seems 
to be proximity to higher-scoring schools. Increasing the average test score of schools in a five-
mile radius by one student-level standard deviation increases the average score at the first-choice 
school by 0.229. Hence the proximity and availability of much higher-scoring schools seem to 
determine both the probability of choosing to leave the NCLB school as well as the test score at 
the first-choice school in July. This is consistent with the strong weight parents place on 
proximity when choosing schools as found in Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006a). Choice is 




5.  The Effect of Choices on Student Outcomes 
 
 
NCLB notification succeeded in changing choices for some parents at Title I Improving schools. 
The simplified information led a significant fraction of parents to choose to send their children to 
higher-performing schools. However, it is not clear if changing the choices that parents make 
improves their child’s academic outcomes. It is therefore important to estimate the impact that 
these choices had on subsequent measures of academic achievement. We will use academic 
outcomes at the end of the first year after NCLB notification to test for the presence of academic 
gains as a result of attending a newly-chosen school. 
 
Once choice forms were submitted, admissions were determined by lottery process. The lotteries 
were run based on the number of seats made available for each grade and choice combination. 
As described earlier, the lottery number was the concatenation of two priority numbers followed 
by a random number. Priority was given to students performing below grade level and to 
students who qualified for free or reduced lunch. This was done to satisfy the NCLB requirement   20
that the lowest-performing and poorest students be given the first right to attend a school other 
than their “failing” school. 
 
We present two different methods for estimating the effect of winning versus losing the lottery 
on outcomes. Method 1 uses only the priority group (if any) in each grade and choice 
combination for which some students won and some students lost that lottery; that is, we include 
only students for whom lottery number alone determined admission to that grade and choice 
combination. Method 2 uses all students, regardless of priority group, whose first-choice school 
and grade is one in which some students won and some students lost the lottery for admission to 
that school. Of the 1,092 students who filled out a form in July and chose a school different than 
their current NCLB school first, 227 students are in the sample defined by Method 1, and 562 
students are in the sample defined by Method 2. 
 
For the sample defined by Method 1, admission is determined solely by lottery number, so the 
impact of winning or losing the lottery is well identified. On the other hand, the sample size is 
small, which may imply that the results do not hold more broadly. Hence, we also use the sample 
defined by Method 2, more than doubling the sample size. However, here admission is 
determined by priority group and lottery number; students with lower tests scores and/or who are 
free- or reduced-lunch recipients have lower (better) priority numbers and hence a better chance 
of admission. We will control for student baseline characteristics, as well as first-choice and 
grade fixed effects, in the regression analyses that follow. 
 
Table VIII reports mean baseline characteristics for lottery winners and losers, as well as 
regression adjusted differences from an OLS regression including fixed effects for the school 
choice program and grade for which the lottery is being conducted (lottery-block fixed effects).
13 
The first three columns use the sample defined by Method 1, and the second three columns use 
the sample defined by Method 2. Coefficients in column 3, rows 1 through 7, show that lottery 
winners and losers do not have significantly different baseline demographic or academic baseline 
characteristics for students in the Method 1 sample. Hence lottery numbers do not predict 
                                                 
13 For the Method 1 sample, note that lottery-block fixed effects span priority-group fixed effects. We must control 
for lottery-block fixed effects since the odds of admission change across each lottery. 
   21
baseline characteristics for students in the Method 1 sample, as we would expect if they were 
indeed randomly assigned. Recall that the lottery was not run as a first-choice maximizer; rather, 
it evaluated a student’s choices when the student’s lottery number came up. To construct the 
Method 1 sample, we treat a student as choosing a school if she listed it as any of her choices. It 
may be the case that students who listed a school second are less likely to be admitted since they 
may have had a higher (worse) priority group and/or higher (worse) lottery number to have not 
been admitted to their first-choice school. The third column of the final row shows that winners 
were no more or less likely to have listed the choice as their first choice than losers were. We fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that there is a differential impact of winning versus losing the lottery 
on the probability of listing the choice first.
14  
 
The last column of Table VIII shows that baseline characteristics do vary significantly across 
lottery winners and losers for students in the Method 2 sample. Students who won the lottery 
were more likely to be black, were more likely to receive free or reduced lunch, had lower 
incomes, had more suspensions, and had lower baseline test scores. These differences are 
mechanically generated by the priority group definitions, and they are most significant for lunch-
recipient status and baseline test scores (the two variables that define priority groups). We 
control for these baseline characteristics when estimating the effect of winning versus losing the 
lottery on student outcomes. 
 
We now want to test if there are significant differences in end-of-year outcomes for students who 
won the lottery to attend their chosen school versus those who lost the admission lottery. Since 
we do not have data on outcome variables for students who were not enrolled in CMS for the 
2004-2005 academic year, it is important to look at attrition. Table IX shows the effect of 
winning versus losing the lottery on whether the student was not enrolled in any CMS school in 
the 2004-2005 school year. This estimate gives the differential attrition between lottery winners 
and lottery losers. The first two columns use the sample defined by Method 1, and the second 
two columns use the sample defined by Method 2. The average attrition rate is 6.2% for students 
                                                 
14 In the Method 1 sample, 172 students listed the school as their first choice, and 55 listed the school as their second 
choice. There were none who listed it as their third choice. However, given the many different choices and the 
availability of those choices, this may not affect our sample considerably.   22
in the Method 1 sample, and 5.0% for students in the Method 2 sample.
15 For the Method 1 
sample, the estimated effect of winning versus losing the lottery on attrition is small (0.057) but 
marginally significant (p-value = 0.081). However this has the opposite sign than what we would 
expect. The positive value implies that, if anything, lottery winners were more likely to attrit than 
lottery losers, instead of the other way around. For the Method 2 sample, the estimated effect of 
winning the lottery on attrition is much smaller (0.012) and is not statistically significantly 
different from zero.  
 
Table X presents the reduced-form estimates of winning versus losing the lottery on measures of 
academic achievement. The first four columns use the sample defined by Method 1, and the 
second four columns use the sample defined by Method 2. The results are presented for all 
students on average, as well as for those with above- and below-median expected “treatment”, 
where treatment is defined as the difference between the test score at the chosen school and the 
test score at the current NCLB school. For the Method 1 sample, the median difference in the test 
score of the chosen school and the test score at the current NCLB school is 0.893 student-level 
standard deviations. For the Method 2 sample, the median difference in the test score of the first-
choice school and the test score at the current NCLB school is 0.642 student-level standard 
deviations. All regressions include fixed effects for each grade and choice combination, as well 
as student baseline characteristics: black, lunch recipient, female, demeaned income, an indicator 
for greater than or equal to five unexcused absences, an indicator for greater than or equal to one 
unexcused absence, an indicator for greater than or equal to five suspensions, an indicator for 
greater than or equal to one suspension, total number of unexcused absences, and total number of 
suspensions. Results for student standardized test score outcomes also include baseline student 
test scores, lowering the sample size to 161 students in the Method 1 sample and 451 in the 
Method 2 sample, as only students in third through eighth grades take these exams. Standard 
errors are clustered at the school-choice and grade level in all regressions. 
 
The first row presents the effect of winning versus losing the lottery on the average test score of 
the school attended. For students in the Method 1 sample, lottery winners attended schools with 
                                                 
15 These rates are lower than typical, but it is probably because students in our sample are observed half way through 
the summer so we would expect them to be lower if most moving occurs in the first half of the summer.    23
on average 0.324 student-level standard deviation higher test scores than lottery losers. Students 
who chose schools with substantially better (above-median) test scores than their current NCLB 
schools attended schools with on average 0.375 student-level standard deviation higher test 
scores if they won the lottery. Students who chose schools with below-median differences in test 
scores attended schools that had 0.166 higher average test scores if they won the lottery; 
however, the coefficient is not significant. For students in the Method 2 sample, lottery winners 
attended schools with on average 0.146 student-level standard deviation higher test scores than 
lottery losers, which is marginally significant (p-value = 0.070). Students who chose schools 
with substantially better (above-median) test scores had a significant 0.256 increase in the score 
of the school attended as a result of winning the lottery. This point estimate is -0.032 and 
insignificant for students winning lotteries to attend schools that with moderately (below-
median) higher scores than their NCLB school. Given that we find a small and insignificant 
effect of winning versus losing the lottery on the test score of the school attended for students 
with a below-median “treatment”, we may not expect to see significant academic gains for these 
students as a result attending their first-choice school. 
 
The second row of Table X shows that winning versus losing the lottery does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the probability of having a week or more (“serious”) unexcused 
absences. This result holds across both samples. However, we do find that, for the Method 1 
sample, the probability of having at least one unexcused absence decreases by 21% (0.174 off of 
a base of 0.845) when students choose, and gain admission to, schools that have above-median 
increases in test scores over their current NCLB schools. Across both samples, the point 
estimates imply that students who choose schools with below-median differences in test scores 
have an increased likelihood of having at least one unexcused absence if they won, and the effect 
is statistically significant for the Method 2 sample. 
 
The fourth and fifth rows of Table X show the impact of winning versus losing the lottery on the 
probability of having at least one week of suspensions (“serious”) or at least one suspension 
(“mild”), respectively. Across both samples, we do not find any evidence that winning versus 
losing the lottery affected the probability of having a “mild” suspension. For the Method 1 
sample, we find, on average, that the likelihood of having “serious” suspensions decreases by a   24
statistically significant 38% (0.099 off of a mean of 0.258) when students win the lottery. While 
the decrease is larger for students in the above-mean “treatment” group, it is not statistically 
significant. The coefficient is closer to zero and insignificant for students in lotteries to attend 
schools with below-median differences in test scores. For the Method 2 sample, the impact of 
winning versus losing the lottery on “serious” suspensions is not statistically significant, both 
overall and for the above- and below-median “treatment” students. Taken together, we do find 
some evidence of an overall decrease in the probability of “serious”, but not “mild” suspensions, 
for lottery winners versus lottery losers. 
 
The final row presents results for standardized test scores. The students’ test scores are the 
average of the math and reading scores for the North Carolina End of Grade tests, standardized 
by grade level. For the students in the Method 1 sample, on average, winning versus losing the 
NCLB lottery had a positive but insignificant effect on student test scores. For the students in the 
Method 2 sample, the overall effect of winning versus losing the lottery is also insignificant, but 
larger in magnitude than in the Method 1 sample. However, across both samples, for the students 
who choose schools with substantially higher test scores than their current NCLB school, there is 
a statistically significant and large effect of winning versus losing the lottery on test scores. 
Across both samples, students who won versus lost these lotteries experienced a gain of 
approximately 0.17 to 0.19 standard deviations on their exams. This is a substantial improvement 
in cognitive outcomes, equivalent to approximately 5-6 percentile rank points on the End of 
Grade exams. For both samples, students applying to schools that were only slightly better than 
their current NCLB schools did not experience gains on test scores. The point estimate is 
insignificant for the two samples, slightly negative in the case of the Method 1 sample and 
slightly positive in the case of the Method 2 sample. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 
The school choice component of NCLB is aimed at allowing parents of children in under-
performing schools the opportunity to choose to send their children to schools with higher 
academic achievement. The immediate goal is to allow these students the opportunity to achieve   25
higher academic outcomes. This paper examined the introduction of NCLB in CMS to determine 
if NCLB had an impact on the school choices parents made and if those choices led to gains in 
academic outcomes.  
 
Using detailed school choice data from CMS, we are able to compare the choices parents made 
prior to NCLB notification with the choices they made after receiving notification. We find that 
NCLB notification led to an overall small but significant change in the choice behavior of 
parents. However, approximately 16% of parents who received notification responded by 
choosing schools with test scores that were on average 1 standard deviation higher than the 
schools they chose to attend just a few months earlier. Thus, the NCLB notification with the 
required simplified information on academic performance of schools in the district facilitated the 
choice of a higher-performing alternative school for a significant fraction of parents. The NCLB 
notification increased the fraction of parents choosing to attend a school other than their NCLB 
school by more than 100%. 
 
We then use the lottery admissions of students to schools to determine if the choices caused by 
NCLB notification resulted in higher academic achievement. We find some evidence that 
winning admission to a chosen school leads to a significant decline in serious suspension rates 
but no significant average gain in standardized test scores. We do find some evidence that 
students who apply to schools that are substantially higher-scoring than their current NCLB 
school do experience significant improvements in test scores. Among students with above-
median differences between the chosen school’s average test score and the score at their current 
NCLB school, admission to the chosen school increased test scores by 0.17 – 0.19 student-level 
standard deviations. 
 
However, our analysis shows that availability of and proximity to high-performing schools is a 
key factor in determining the probability of responding to NCLB notification by choosing an 
alternative school, the average test score at the school chosen, and hence the estimated test score 
gain from attending the chosen school. Our results suggest that the availability of proximate and 
high-scoring school alternatives is an important factor in determining the degree to which the 
NCLB choice component can be successful at both allowing access through choice to alternative   26
schools and increasing academic outcomes for the students exercising choice. School districts 
with large geographic densities of low-performing schools may therefore face more difficulty in 
experiencing positive effects on student choice and subsequent outcomes as a result of the NCLB 
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(N = 117) 
Non-NCLB 
Schools 
(N = 101) 
NCLB 
Schools 
(N = 16) 
School characteristics      
Average Test Score  -0.069  0.026  -0.672 
 (0.457)  (0.414)  (0.163) 
      
Has Academic Magnet  0.350  0.356  0.313 
 (0.479)  (0.481)  (0.479) 
      
% Lunch Recipients  52.977  47.261  89.061 
  (28.089) (25.853) (6.060) 
      
% Black  46.547  41.645  77.489 
 (24.666)  (22.367)  (13.670) 
      
Average Income
† 52,334  55,551  32,022 
  (17,330) (16,361) (5,307) 
      
%  Capacity  104.470 105.700 96.699 
 (15.612)  (15.078)  (17.164) 
      
% Students With at Least One Suspension  13.772  11.443  28.476 
 (12.690)  (10.232)  (16.740) 
      
% AYP Requirements Met  95.841  98.003  82.194 
 (7.888)  (3.798)  (12.444) 
      
Number of Students  708.145  738.228  518.250 
 (294.770)  (299.504)  (171.373) 
Notes: Data are from the 2003-2004 school year. Standard deviations are in parentheses. All Schools and 
Non-NCLB Schools do not include high schools or alternative schools since every NCLB school is an 
elementary or middle school. 
†Income for a student is calculated as the median block-group household income level from the 2000 Census 
for households of a student’s own race for the block group that the student lives in. We average this over 
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Table II: Cross Tabulation of Parents Who Chose Non-NCLB Schools in Spring and July 
 
Did Not Choose NCLB 
School First in July 
Chose NCLB School 
First in July  Total 
Did Not Choose NCLB 







    
Chose NCLB School 





















Table III: Regression Adjusted Treatment Effect 
Variable  Spring Mean  July Mean  Treatment Effect 
Chose NCLB School First 
 
0.888 0.837  -0.051
*** 
(0.006) 
      





      





      






    
Number of Observations  6,695 6,695 13,990 
Notes: Data are from the 2003-2004 school year. Treatment Effect reports the coefficient on an indicator for July 2004 from 
separate regressions with each variable in the first column as the dependent variable, controlling for student fixed effects. 
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Table IV: Differences in Choice Characteristics for Students Who Chose Out in July 
Variable  All Students  Black  Not Black 
Average Test Score at First-Choice School       
          Spring 2004  -0.502  -0.513  -0.421 
          July 2004  -0.017  -0.034  0.108 
Average Test Score of Schools Within 5 Miles       
          Spring 2004  -0.322  -0.328  -0.277 
          July 2004  -0.247  -0.253  -0.206 
% Black at First-Choice School       
          Spring 2004  75.557  76.588  67.857 
          July 2004  49.351  50.278  42.426 
% Lunch Recipients at First-Choice School       
          Spring 2004  78.565  79.128  74.358 
          July 2004  43.350  43.867  39.495 
     
Number of Students  1,092 963  129 
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Table V: Comparison of Student Characteristics: Chose Out Versus Chose NCLB School 
Variable 
Did Not Choose 
NCLB School 
First in July 
Chose NCLB 




Did Not Choose NCLB School 





















































































Distance to NCLB School 
 
3.497 2.859  0.405
*** 
(0.119) 
Average Distance to Schools 







Average Test Score at NCLB 
School 
-0.632 -0.633  -- 
-- 
Average Test Score of Schools 








     
Number of Students
†  1,092 5,603 6,695 
Notes: Data are from the 2003-2004 school year. Adjusted difference reports the coefficient on whether the 
student did not choose her NCLB school first in July from separate regressions with each variable in the first 
column as the dependent variable, controlling for NCLB school fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering 
at the level of the NCLB school. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 
†Student test score is the average of reading and math scores on the North Carolina End of Grade exams. Only 
students in grades three through eight take these exams, so this variable is based on 818 students who did not 
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Did Not Choose NCLB School First 
in Spring  0.759
*** 0.124  0.000 
      
Black 0.448
* 0.248 0.071 
      
Lunch Recipient  0.131  0.162  0.419 
      
Female -0.031  0.071  0.660 
      
Test Score  0.106
** 0.049  0.030 
      
Demeaned Income  -0.002  0.002  0.383 
      
Number of Unexcused Absences  -0.019
*** 0.007  0.006 
      
Number of Suspensions  0.014
*** 0.004  0.000 
      
Rising Grader  0.203
** 0.087  0.020 
      
In Magnet Program  0.142
** 0.062  0.022 
      
Distance to NCLB School  0.019  0.012  0.120 
      
Average Distance to Schools 
Within 5 Miles in July Choice Set  0.009  0.029  0.748 
      
Average Test Score of Schools 
Within 5 Miles in July Choice Set  0.608
*** 0.208  0.003 
     
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.176    
Number of Students  4,646    
Log Pseudolikelihood  -2,029.688    
Notes: Data are from the 2003-2004 school year. Conditional (fixed-effects) logit estimation with NCLB 
school fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the NCLB school. Asterisks 
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Table VII: Determinants of Test Score at Chosen School in July 
Dependent Variable: Test Score 
at July First-Choice School  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  P-value 
Did Not Choose NCLB School First 
in Spring  0.103
*** 0.021  0.000 
      
Black -0.082
** 0.028  0.011 
      
Lunch Recipient  -0.069
*** 0.022  0.006 
      
Female -0.027  0.017  0.136 
      
Test Score  0.025  0.019  0.208 
      
Demeaned Income  -0.001  0.001  0.439 
      
Number of Unexcused Absences  -0.003
* 0.002  0.067 
      
Number of Suspensions  0.001  0.001  0.376 
      
Rising Grader  -0.052  0.038  0.189 
      
In Magnet Program  0.077
*** 0.016  0.000 
      
Distance to NCLB School  -0.015
** 0.005  0.016 
      
Average Distance to Schools Within 
5 Miles in July Choice Set  -0.010  0.014  0.468 
      
Average Test Score of Schools 
Within 5 Miles in July Choice Set  0.229
*** 0.052  0.001 
      
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.019    
Number of Students  818    
Adjusted R-squared  0.1354    
Notes: Data are from the 2003-2004 school year. Linear regression estimation with NCLB school fixed 
effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the NCLB school. Asterisks indicate 
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Table VIII: Baseline Characteristics by Lottery Winners and Lottery Losers 














In Priority Group for First 
Choice 
0.713 0.804 -0.079 
(0.073) 
-- -- -- 
-- 
        
Black  0.878 0.875 0.049 
(0.065) 
0.902 0.871  0.105
** 
(0.049) 
        
Lunch Recipient  0.965  0.973  -0.013 
(0.013) 
0.925 0.853  0.181
*** 
(0.041) 
        
Female  0.461 0.518 0.015 
(0.084) 
0.481 0.526 -0.067 
(0.078) 
        
Income 30,207  28,658  1,892.770 
(2,029.906) 
30,846 31,351  -3,961.591
* 
(2,055.373) 
        
Number of Unexcused 
Absences 
5.009 5.875 -1.634 
(1.140) 
5.762 4.920 0.371 
(0.680) 
        
Number of Suspensions  3.626  3.732  0.863 
(1.302) 
4.743 3.540  2.732
** 
(1.037) 
        
Test  Score  -0.796 -0.886 -0.066 
(0.061) 
-0.874 -0.366  -0.990
*** 
(0.056) 
        
Number of Students
†  115 112 227 214 348 562 
Notes: Adjusted Difference reports the coefficient on whether the student won the lottery from separate regressions with each variable in the 
first column as the dependent variable. Lottery-block fixed effects are included for specifications using Method 1 Sample, and grade and first-
choice combination fixed effects are included for specifications using Method 2 Sample. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the 
fixed effects. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 
†Test score is the average of reading and math scores on the North Carolina End of Grade exams. Only students in grades three through eight 
take these exams, so this variable is based on 89 students who won the lottery and 91 students who lost the lottery in the Method 1 Sample, and 














   37
Table IX: The Impact of Winning Versus Losing the Lottery on Attrition 












Not Present in CMS at Beginning 








        
Number of Students  227 227 562  562 
Notes: Regression Adjusted Difference is from a regression of an indicator of attrition on whether the student won the lottery, 
controlling for the following baseline covariates: black, lunch recipient, female, demeaned income, an indicator for greater 
than or equal to five unexcused absences, an indicator for greater than or equal to one unexcused absence, an indicator for 
greater than or equal to five suspensions, an indicator for greater than or equal to one suspension, total number of unexcused 
absences, and total number of suspensions. Lottery-block fixed effects are included for specifications using Method 1 Sample, 
and grade and first-choice combination fixed effects are included for specifications using Method 2 Sample. Standard errors 
adjust for clustering at the level of the fixed effects. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 
 Table X: The Impact of Winning Versus Losing the Lottery on Outcomes 
  Method 1 Sample  Method 2 Sample 



































                














                
















                















                














                
Number of Students  213  213  107 106  534  534  271  263 
















                
Number of Students  161  161  82 79  451  451  213 238 
Notes: Each column reports the coefficient on whether the student won the lottery from separate regressions with each variable in the first column as the dependent variable, controlling for the 
following baseline covariates: black, lunch recipient, female, demeaned income, an indicator for greater than or equal to five unexcused absences, an indicator for greater than or equal to one 
unexcused absence, an indicator for greater than or equal to five suspensions, an indicator for greater than or equal to one suspension, total number of unexcused absences, and total number of 
suspensions. The Student’s Test Score specification includes baseline student test score. Lottery-block fixed effects are included for specifications using Method 1 Sample, and grade and first-
choice combination fixed effects are included for specifications using Method 2 Sample. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the fixed effects. Asterisks indicate significance 
(*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 
3
8Figure I: Kernel Density Estimate of Difference in Test Score Between July First-Choice 
School and NCLB School for Families Who Did Not Choose NCLB School First in July 
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Note: We use the Epanechnikov kernel and the optimal width as computed by default in Stata. 
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